As cryptocurrencies continue to surge in popularity, their disruptive nature within the traditional financial sector has become increasingly apparent. While the crypto movement initially emerged as a response to fractional reserve banking and the 2008 shadow banking crisis, opinion columnist Matt Levine makes the striking observation that by 2022, the crypto industry has matured enough to recreate “both fractional reserve banking (but without regulation!) and a 2008-style shadow banking crisis.”
Levine identifies various “crypto shadow banks,” such as FTX, Celsius, and Voyager, which he says have managed to operate without having to follow standard banking regulations, aggressively market their services, and potentially lose their customers’ money. The lack of regulation on these companies raises the question of whether they are becoming increasingly interconnected with the real economy, potentially making future runs on these “crypto shadow banks” more destructive.
Levine proposes two potential scenarios that could develop in response to these concerns. In the first scenario, U.S. regulators could choose to protect “crypto shadow banks” from runs by subjecting them to deposit insurance and regulation, similar to traditional financial institutions. Alternatively, regulators could decide to protect the real economy from exposure to these companies by making it challenging for the traditional financial sector to establish ties with crypto businesses.
According to Levine, U.S. regulators seem to be leaning towards the second option, which he believes to be the better choice when considering both regulatory preferences and crypto’s own preferences. He explains: “Just imagine implementing Option 1. Imagine the meeting between the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and, like, Tether, to talk about supervision and deposit insurance.”
Levine concludes by outlining two possible explanations for the insufficient liquidity buffers seen in “crypto shadow banks.” The first possibility is that these companies should have been regulated, as U.S. banking regulators would have compelled them to implement higher liquidity buffers. The second explanation revolves around the fact that these companies’ business affairs of lending against volatile collateral were inherently risky and run-prone. If U.S. banking regulators had supervised these platforms, they may still have faced runs and gone bust, but the blame would fall on the government.
With the crypto industry continuously evolving and growing in influence, how regulators choose to approach these “crypto shadow banks” and their potential impact on the traditional financial sector will inevitably be a critical issue in the coming years. Understanding these scenarios and their implications will be crucial for both crypto enthusiasts and the broader economy.
Source: Cryptonews
